record custodian, 4 who resisted a subpoena to produce documents on the ground that his act of producing the documents would tend to incriminate himself. 5 The Court ruled instead that the common law collective entity doctrine 6 precluded petitioner Braswell's claimed act of production privilege.
poena personally to "'Randy Braswell, President Worldwide Machinery, Inc.
[and] Worldwide Purchasing, Inc.'"32 The subpoena did not require Braswell to testify, but ordered him to produce certain documents of the two corporations A 3 Braswell moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that his act of producing the documents would violate his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. 34 The district court denied the motion and ordered Braswell to produce the documents. 3 5 The court held that the collective entity doctrine 3 6 precluded Braswell from asserting a fifth amendment privilege for the production of corporate documents. 3 7 Braswell subsequently appeared before the grand jury but refused to produce the documents. 3 8 The district court held Braswell in contempt of court and suspended his commitment, pending an appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Braswell's motion to quash the subpoena. 40 The court cited Bellis v. United States 4 1 as support for the proposition that a corporate record custodian may not refuse a 32 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2286 (citation omitted). 33 Id. The subpoena ordered Braswell to produce the following documents: Receipts and disbursement journals; general ledger and subsidiaries; accounts receivable [and] accounts payable ledgers, cards, and all customer data; bank records of savings and checking accounts, including statements, checks, and deposit tickets; contracts, invoices -sales and purchase -conveyances, and correspondence; minutes and stock books and ledgers; loan disclosure statements and agreements; liability ledgers; and retained copies of Forms 1120, W-2, W-4, 1099, 940 and 941. Id. at 2286 n.1. 34 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d at 192.
Id.
36 See supra note 6. 37 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2286. The district court noted that "Braswell was obviously doing business through the corporate name but was managing the affairs of the corporation as close to the manner in which a sole proprietorship would be handled as almost could be conceived." In re GrandJury Proceedings, 814 F.2d at 192. Nevertheless, the district court rejected Braswell's argument that "the collective entity doctrine does not apply when a corporation is so small that it constitutes nothing more than the individual's alter ego." Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2286. 38 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d at 192.
40 Id. at 193 . 41 417 U.S. 85 (1974) . The Court held in Bellis that a partner in a three-person law firm could not refuse a subpoena to produce partnership documents on the ground that the documents' contents might tend to incriminate him. Id. at 101. While the Court employed the collective entity doctrine to reject the claimed privilege as to the documents' contents, the Court endorsed the compelled testimony standard in principle if not in name: " [T] he privilege against compulsory self-incrimination should be 'limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony.'" Id. at 89-90 (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944) ).
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[Vol. 79 subpoena to produce documents on fifth amendment grounds, regardless of the corporation's size. 4 2 Thus, the court ruled that "Braswell's contention that his 'one-man' corporations are not collective entities must fail."
'4 3
The Courts of Appeals had split on the issue of whether a corporate record custodian may assert a fifth amendment privilege as to the act of production to resist a subpoena for documents. 4 Braswell' s motion to quash a subpoena to produce documents. 4 8 The Court held that the custodian of corporate records may not resist a subpoena to produce documents on the ground that the act of production will personally incriminate him in violation of the fifth amendment. 4 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 50 began the opinion by reaffirming two tenets historically promulgated in the Court's fifth amendment analysis: the contents of business documents are not privileged under the fifth amendment; 5 1 and artificial 42 In re GrandJury Proceedings, 814 F.2d at 192. 43 Id. 44 The Second, Third, Fourth, Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits have allowed an act of production privilege for the custodian of collective entity documents. See In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1987 Cir. 1980) . 45 Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 64 (1987) . 46 Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 Ct. , 2287 Ct. (1988 . 47 108 S. Ct. 2284 Ct. (1988 . 48 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2287. 49 Id. entities may not assert a fifth amendment privilege. 5 2 The Court noted that Braswell challenged neither of these principles, but rather, asserted that "his act of producing the documents [had] independent testimonial significance, which would incriminate him individually, and that the Fifth Amendment prohibits government compulsion of that act."1 5 3 The majority indicated that this argument was premised on the Court's decisions in Fisher v. United States and United States v. Doe. 54 ChiefJustice Rehnquist proceeded to summarize the Fisher and Doe opinions. The Chief Justice stated that the issue in Fisher was whether an attorney may assert a fifth amendment privilege to resist a subpoena to produce client tax records prepared by the client's accountant. 55 According to the majority, the Court in Fisher stated that the fifth amendment prohibits compelled testimonial self-incrimination, and recognized that:
"[t]he act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced 56 .... The elements of compulsion are clearly present, but the more difficult issues are whether the tacit averments of the taxpayer are both 'testimonial' and 'incriminating' for purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment." '57 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, Fisher concluded that the act of production in that case would not effect testimonial selfincrimination. 58 Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that Doe held that a sole proprietor possessed a fifth amendment privilege prohibiting compelled production of business records. 59 The ChiefJustice hypothe- 52 Id. (citing Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) ). 53 Id. (emphasis added). 54 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2287 (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 391, and Doe, 465 U.S. at 605). 55 Id. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, Fisher determined the availability of a fifth amendment privilege to the attorney by determining whether the taxpayer-client was protected under the fifth amendment. Id.
56 Courts following the act of production doctrine generally imply three testimonial statements manifested in the production of documents: 1) an admission that the documents exist; 2) that they are in the possession of the custodian; and 3) that the custodian believes them to be authentic. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410; Doe, 465 U.S. at 613 n.ll.
57 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2287 (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410). 58 Id. at 2287-88 (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411). Fisher ruled that the existence and location of the accountant's workpapers was a foregone conclusion, and thus the act of production had no testimonial value. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. Furthermore, the Court noted that the workpapers were prepared by and belonged to the accountant. Id. Thus the Court found little testimonial significance in the taxpayer's act of production. Id. 59 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2288. The Court in Doe did not examine the testimonial aspects of the proprietor's act of production. Doe, 465 U.S. at 614. Rather, as the majority indicated, the Court deferred to the district and appellate courts, "which had found SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 79
sized that, had Braswell operated his business as a sole proprietorship, he would have been entitled under Doe to an opportunity to prove the testimonial and incriminating nature of his act of production. 60 The majority asserted, however, that courts have long distinguished between corporations and individuals for purposes of fifth amendment analysis. 6 ' The Chief Justice stated that the Court determines the fifth amendment rights of the former according to the collective entity doctrine. 62 Before applying the collective entity doctrine to the facts of Braswell, ChiefJustice Rehnquist traced the Court's development of the doctrine. According to the majority, the Court first enunciated the collective entity rule in Hale v. Henkel. 63 The majority observed that Hale rejected a corporate officer's attempt to resist a subpoena to produce documents by asserting a fifth amendment privilege on behalf of the corporation. 64 ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted that Hale distinguished between the fifth amendment protection of individuals and corporations, 6 5 and premised the distinction on the fact that corporations are " 'creature[s] of the State,' with powers limited by the State. ' 6 6 Thus, the majority observed, the state's right to demand the records is merely an exercise of its power of visitation 67 over the corporation. 68 Chief Justice Rehnquist described Hale as limiting the Court's earlier decision in Boyd v. United States. 6 9 According to the majority, Boyd held that partnership records are the "'private books and papers' " of the partners, and therefore are protected under the fifth amendment. 70 ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated that Hale limited Boyd by declaring that corporate documents are not private papers, and thus are not privileged under the fifth amendment. The majority next examined Wilson v. United States, 72 in which the issue was whether a corporate officer could resist a subpoena to produce corporate documents by asserting a personal privilege against self-incrimination. 73 ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated that the Court rejected Wilson's claimed privilege, holding instead that the subpoenaed documents belonged to the corporation and were not the private papers of the officer. 7 4 Wilson added, according to the majority, that the state's visitatorial power over corporations would be thwarted if an officer could assert a personal privilege over corporate documents. 75 The majority noted that the next significant application of the collective entity doctrine occurred in United States v. White. 76 According to the majority, White held that a labor union was a collective entity, and thus precluded a union supervisor from withholding union documents pursuant to a subpoena. 77 Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted the test enunciated in White for determining when an organization qualifies as a collective entity:
"The test ... is whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their common or group interests The majority summarized the doctrine of these cases, from Hale to Bellis, as holding that a corporate custodian may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on fifth amendment grounds, regardless of whether the subpoena is addressed to the corporation or to the custodian. The majority turned next to Braswell' 8 8 such an agent holds corporate documents in a representative capacity rather than a personal capacity; 8 9 the custodian's act of production is therefore not a personal act but an act of the corporation; 90 and permitting the custodian to assert a fifth amendment privilege "would be tantamount to a claim of privilege by the corporation -which of course possesses no such privilege." 9 1
Chief Justice Rehnquist also observed that the Court rejected the custodians' fifth amendment claims in Dreier and Bellis even though both cases involved compelled testimonial production.
92
While the ChiefJustice admitted that the Dreier and Bellis Courts did not examine the testimonial aspect of the act of production, he speculated that such an inquiry would not have affected the Court's decisions. 92 Id. The majority noted that the government addressed the subpoena to the custodian in each case, and that the act of production would have tacitly admitted the records' existence and possession by the custodian. Id. (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411-12). 93 Id. The Chief Justice was correct to the extent that the Dreier and Bellis Courts applied the collective entity doctrine, which does not predetermine fifth amendment protection on the existence of compelled testimonial incrimination. For a description of Moreover, the majority rejected the notion that Fisher and Doe supported petitioner Braswell's claim. Chief Justice Rehnquist dismissed Doe as inapplicable to the issue before the Court, and limited the Court's holding in that case to the production of documents by a sole proprietor. 94 The Chief Justice also claimed that the Fisher opinion "indicate [d] that the custodian of corporate records may not interpose a Fifth Amendment objection to the compelled production of corporate records, even though the act of production may prove personally incriminating." 9 5 Fisher recognized, according to the majority, that the Court has consistently denied a record custodian's attempt to refuse a subpoena to produce documents, even though such production has authenticated the documents, 96 and admitted their existence and possession by the custodian. Chief Justice Rehnquist found support for the majority's position in Justice Brennan's concurrence in Fisher. 98 Justice Brennan espoused the notion, according to the majority, that a custodian waives the right to exercise a personal privilege while acting as the representative of a collective entity. 9 9 ChiefJustice Rehnquist conthe elements of the collective entity doctrine, see infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. The existence of compelled testimonial incrimination, however, is dispositive of fifth amendment protection under the compelled testimony standard more recently espoused by the Court. See infra note 206 and accompanying text. 94 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2292 n.5. ChiefJustice Rehnquist reasoned that the Court refrained from discussing the collective entity doctrine in Doe because a sole proprietor holds documents in a personal rather than representative capacity. Id.
95 Id. at 2292. This interpretation is troubling for two reasons. First, Fisher did not involve a corporate custodian. Rather, the case involved the fifth amendment claim of an individual taxpayer. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402 (1976). Because Chief Justice Rehnquist strictly limited the Court's grant of fifth amendment protection in Doe to the production of documents by a sole proprietor, see supra note 94 and accompanying text, it is inconsistent to stretch Fisher's rejection of an individual taxpayer's privilege to include all corporate custodians.
Secondly, Fisher rejected the taxpayer's claimed privilege for the sole reason that, under the facts of that case, the taxpayer's act of production was not sufficiently testimonial. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414. On the contrary, the Court found that the existence and location of the papers was a "foregone conclusion." Id. at 411. The court thus "h[e]ld that compliance with a summons directing the taxpayer to produce the accountant's documents ... would involve no incriminating testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment." Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414. Chief Justice Rehnquist's statement was therefore misleading, for an incriminating and compelled production of documents is not accorded fifth amendment protection under Fisher only when it is insufficiently testimonial. 96 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2292 (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 413 n.14). 97 Id. (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411-12). See supra note 56. Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted that the Fisher Court cited the collective entity decisions in support of its holding. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2292. 98 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2292. 99 Id. The majority recognized, however, that Justice Brennan disagreed with the Fisher majority's conclusion that the act of production was not sufficiently testimonial.
cluded that, whether you adopt the Fisher majority opinion that the act of production is not sufficiently testimonial, or believe that a collective entity custodian waives his fifth amendment right, "the lesson of Fisher is clear: a custodian may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on Fifth Amendment grounds." 1 0 0
The majority also rejected Braswell's reliance on Curcio v. United States o 1 ' and indicated that that case supported the government's position.
10 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist restated Braswell's analysis of Curcio as follows: Curcio held that the government may not compel the representative of a collective entity to give testimony about the entity's records, even though the contents of the records are not privileged; 1 0 3 since Fisher held that the act of production may be testimonial, the government could not compel Braswell's production of documents under Curcio if it would tend to incriminate him. Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected this line of reasoning and stated instead that Curcio distinguished between "oral testimony and other forms of incrimination." 0 5 The majority observed that, while Curcio recognized the testimonial effect implicit in producing documents,1 06 the Court concluded that the government might have sucId. (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 429 (Brennan, J., concurring) (" 'Nothing in the language of [the collective entity] cases, either expressly or impliedly, indicates that the act of production with respect to the records of business entities is insufficiently testimonial for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.' ")). 100 Id. This is a very broad reading of Fisher. See supra note 95. The Court in Fisher rejected the taxpayer's fifth amendment claim strictly because it found that the taxpayer's act of production was insufficiently testimonial, and therefore failed the compelled testimony standard. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414. Thus, a more accurate recitation of the Fisher "lesson" is that a custodian may not resist a subpoena for collective entity reords on fifth amendment grounds where the act of producing the documents is insufficiently testimonial.
101 354 U.S. 118 (1957)(holding that the fifth amendment protects a union record custodian from testifying on the whereabouts of union documents). 102 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2293. The majority noted that in Curcio the government served two subpoenas on an officer of a local union -one requiring the officer to produce union records and the other requiring him to testify. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2293. The Curcio Court allowed the officer's fifth amendment claim, according to the majority, and rejected "the Government's argument 'that the representative duty which required the production of union records in the White case requires the giving of oral testimony by the custodian.''" Id. (quoting Curcio, 354 U.S. at 123). 103 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2293. 106 According to the majority, the Curcio Court realized that: "The custodian's act of producing books or records in response to a subpoena duces cessfully compelled the production under the subpoena duces
The majority warned that granting a fifth amendment privilege to the holders of collective entity records would seriously jeopardize the government's ability to regulate white-collar crime.' 0 8 Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that such protection would inhibit government prosecution of individuals and organizations alike.' 0 9
The majority also rejected Braswell's two solutions to this perceived problem of impeding the regulation of white-collar crime: 1) address the subpoena to the corporation and allow it to select an agent for producing the documents, or 2) grant statutory immunity, 10 for the custodian's act of production. Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to -(1) a court or grand jury of the United States, (2) an agency of the United States, or (3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee or a subcommittee of either House, and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982) .
Section 6003 states: (a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order requiring such individual to give testimony or quist labelled the first solution a "chimera," ' 1 12 if the custodian was the only person with knowledge of the documents' location but could still refuse to assist the appointed replacement on the ground that such assistance would be incriminating.' 13 The majority stated that sending an alternate custodian on an unassisted search for documents might well result in the documents never reaching the courthouse.
14
Chief Justice Rehnquist similarly disposed of the second proposed solution of granting statutory immunity as to the act of production. 1 15 The Chief Justice noted that the prosecution may not use testimony elicited under a grant of statutory immunity, either directly or derivatively against the testifying party. 1 6 The majority asserted that this limitation places a heavy burden on the state to prove that evidence was obtained from independent sources, and accordingly "may result in the preclusion of crucial evidence that was obtained legitimately.""17
Finally, ChiefJustice Rehnquist relented as to the government's evidentiary use of a custodian's act of production. 1 18 The ChiefJustice stated that "[b]ecause the custodian acts as a representative, the act is deemed one of the corporation and not the individual. Therefore, the Government concedes, as it must, that it may make no evidentiary use of the 'individual act' against the individual." ' 19 provide other information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment-(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and (2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1982 117 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2295 (citing Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460-62 (holding that derivative use of compelled testimony is coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege, and grant of immunity "imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony")). Continuing, however, the Chief Justice stated that "[t]he Government has the right ... to use the corporation's act of production against the custodian."' 120 ChiefJustice Rehnquist distinguished these two uses as follows: on the one hand, the government may not establish that it served the subpoena upon the custodian or that the custodian produced the documents; 12 1 on the other hand, the government may admit into evidence the fact that the corporation produced the subpoenaed documents, knowing that the jury will "reasonably infer that [the custodian] had possession of the documents or knowledge of their contents."' 122 The Chief Justice acknowledged that the jury is particularly likely to make such an inference when, as in Braswell, the custodian holds an influential position within the organization.' 23 In accordance with the aforementioned analysis, the majority affirmed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling that Braswell could not resist the subpoena to produce the corporations' records on the ground that the act of production might personally incriminate him in violation of the fifth amendment.' 24 IV. THE DISSENTING OPINION Justice Kennedy authored the dissenting opinion, in which three justices joined. 1 2 5 The dissent asserted that the collective entity doctrine was irrelevant to the issue of an act of production privilege. 126 Justice Kennedy renounced the majority's limitation of Curcio to oral testimony, and stated that the case's true hallmark is the denial of compelled disclosure of one's thoughts or knowledge. 12 7 The dissent rebuked Chief Justice Rehnquist's heavy reliance on agency principles and pointed out that the agency rationale was undermined by the Court's own attempt to mitigate the severity of its holding. have any place in fifth amendment analysis.' 2 9
Justice Kennedy stated that the extensive common law development of fifth amendment analysis concerning artificial entities has solidified two basic principles of the self-incrimination clause: "first, that it is an explicit right of a natural person, protecting the realm of human thought and expression; second, that it is confined to governmental compulsion."' 30 The dissent asserted that the majority impaired these principles by holding that the government may compel incriminating testimony from an individual who is the target of a criminal investigation.'31 The Court reasoned, according to the dissent, that an employee of an artificial entity has no fifth amendment privilege simply because the entity itself has none. Justice Kennedy stated that there is "no historical or logical relation between the so-called collective entity rule and [Braswell's claimed act of production] privilege."' 3 3 To support this statement, the dissent traced the common law elements of the fifth amendment privilege. Justice Kennedy reiterated that the Court prohibited the compelled production of private documents in Boyd.
13 4 The dissent also noted, however, that Boyd "generated nearly a century of doctrinal ambiguity as [the Court] explored its rationale and sought to define its protection for the contents of business records under the Fifth Amendment."' 3 5 Justice Kennedy stated that the Court in Doe rejected Boyd's privacy rationale. 13 6 According to the dissent, Doe held that the contents of business documents are not privileged unless the subpoenaed party proves that the documents were created under government compulsion.1 37 129 Id. at 2301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 130 Id. at 2296 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 131 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent declared that the majority "denie[d] an individual his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in order to vindicate the rule that a collective entity which employs him has no such privilege itself." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) . 132 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 133 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy prefaced this statement by noting that the majority and the dissent agreed that: 1) artificial entities have no privilege; 2) individuals may not claim a privilege on behalf of an artificial entity; 3) the contents of business documents are not protected under the fifth amendment; and 4) both sides admitted that compelling Braswell to produce the subpoenaed documents would personally incriminate him. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Justice Kennedy identified the issue in Braswell as "whether an individual may be compelled, simply by virtue of his status as a corporate custodian, to perform a testimonial act which will incriminate him personally."' ' 45 Justice Kennedy recognized that the majority relied on the collective entity doctrine to answer that question affirmatively. The dissent asserted, however, that the collective entity doctrine was irrelevant to Braswell's claim.' 4 6 The dissent defined the scope of the collective entity doctrine as three-pronged: first, a corporation may not assert a fifth amendment privilege to resist a 138 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This fact supports the notion that the contents of business documents are not protected under the fifth amendment but the act of producing documents may be privileged. See Doe, 465 U.S. at 612. 139 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 140 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy asserted that the act of production communicates the authenticity of the documents, and their possession or control by the custodian. subpoena to produce documents; 14 7 second, this principle applies to unincorporated organizations, such as labor unions 48 and partnerships; 49 and third, an organization's record custodian may not resist a subpoena to produce documents by asserting a privilege as to the documents' contents. 150 Justice Kennedy stated, however, that none of the Supreme Court's decisions applying the collective entity doctrine dealt with the issue of a custodian's self-incrimination through the compelled act of production. 1 5 1 The dissent noted particularly that Wilson premised its rejection of a claimed fifth amendment privilege on the incriminating nature of the documents' contents. 152 Moreover, according to Justice Kennedy, Wilson reflected the Court's concern with maintaining the state's visitatorial powers over corporations, a concern which is predicated on the content of business records. Justice Kennedy distinguished the act of production privilege from a privilege as to the content of documents as follows: "While a custodian has no necessary relation to the contents of documents within his control, the act of production is inescapably his own. Production is the precise act compelled by the subpoena, and obedience, in some cases, will require the custodian's own testimonial assertions." 1 54 The dissent asserted that this principle was the foundation of the privilege granted in Doe. 15 5 Justice Kennedy also asserted that, while Doe involved the production of a proprietorship's records as opposed to a corporation's, "the potential for self-incrimination inheres in the act demanded of the individual, and as a consequence the nature of the entity is irrelevant to determining whether there is ground for the privilege."' 156 According to the dissent, the focus of the Court's fifth amendment analysis shifted in Fisher and Doe away from an agency rationale toward the principle of compulsion. 15 7 Thus, Justice Kennedy noted that Fisher rejected the claim that voluntarily prepared busi-ness documents were protected under the fifth amendment. 158 Notwithstanding this shift, Justice Kennedy reaffirmed the validity of the principles underlying the collective entity doctrine. 15 9 He commented, however, that a collective entity custodian is now prohibited from asserting a fifth amendment privilege as to the contents of entity documents, not because of the status of the entity, but because business documents generally are not created by compulsion.160 The dissent analogized the testimonial act of production ordered of Braswell to the testimonial act compelled in Curcio.
t6 ' Justice Kennedy stated that the government in Curcio subpoenaed a labor union custodian to give oral testimony on the whereabouts of certain union documents.1 6 2 Justice Kennedy observed that, at the time of Curcio, the Court had previously determined that a union was a collective entity for fifth amendment purposes. 63 Nevertheless, the dissent noted, the Court rejected the government's argument that the custodian was acting in a representative capacity, and held instead that compelling him to testify on the location of documents would " 'require[] him to disclose the contents of his own mind.... That is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Fifth Amendment.' 164 The 165 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy criticized the majority, stating that it "is able to distinguish Curcio only by giving much apparent weight to the words 'out of his own mouth,' reading Curcio to stand for the proposition that the Constitution treats oral testimony different than it does other forms of assertion." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
wrote, " [t] here is no basis in the text or history of the Fifth Amendment for such a distinction. The self-incrimination clause speaks of compelled 'testimony,' and has always been understood to apply to testimony in all its forms."' 166 Justice Kennedy instead proferred that the true distinction promulgated in Curcio is between "a subpoena which compels a person to 'disclose the contents of his own mind,' through words or actions, and one which does not."' 67 The dissent also criticized Chief Justice Rehnquist's pervasive reliance on agency principles to support the Court's holding.
8
The dissent stated that "[t]he majority gives the corporate agent fiction a weight it simply cannot bear."' 16 9 Justice Kennedy noted that the majority concluded from simple agency principles that a custodian's compliance with a subpoena is exclusively the act of the organization.' 7 0 Justice Kennedy asserted, however, that this conclusion contradicted Curcio, in which the Court held that a union officer's "testimony ... may not be divorced from the person who speaks it." 171 In an attempt to cut through the majority's abstruse agency rationale, Justice Kennedy challenged that "It]he heart of the matter, as everyone knows, is that the Government does not see Braswell as a mere agent at all; and the majority's theory is difficult to square with what will often be the Government's actual practice." ' 172 Thus, the dissent noted that the government addressed the subpoena specifically to Braswell and A custodian who is incriminated simply by the contents of the documents he has physically transmitted has not been compelled to disclose his memory or perception or cognition. A custodian who is incriminated by the personal knowledge he communicates in locating and selecting the document demanded in a Government subpoena has been compelled to testify in the most elemental, constitutional sense. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) .
168 Id. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy referred to the majority's agency rationale as a "metaphysical progression, which, I respectfully submit, is flawed."
Id. at 2299-2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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wanted to force the specific target of the investigation to comply with the subpoena.' 7 5 Justice Kennedy contended that "[t]his is not the language of agency. By issuing a subpoena which the Government insists is 'directed to petitioner personally,' it has forfeited any claim that it is simply making a demand on a corporation that, in turn, will have to find a physical agent to perform its duty."' 76 The dissent also argued that the agency relationship is particularly illusory when the government admits, as it did in Braswell, that the custodian's act of production is implicitly testimonial.
7
Justice Kennedy charged that the majority undermined its own agency rationale by holding that the government may compel the custodian's act of production, but may not admit into evidence the fact that he performed the act. 178 Justice Kennedy questioned the Court's authority for ruling that such evidence is inadmissible.
179
The dissent pointed out that the fifth amendment is the sole authority for declaring relevant evidence inadmissible when a defendant reveals the information through his or her own actions. 18 0 Yet if the fifth amendment prohibits the admission of act of production evidence, Justice Kennedy stated that "it is because the Fifth Amendment protects the person without regard to his status as a corporate employee; and once this be admitted, the necessary [agency rationale] for the majority's case has collapsed."''
The dissent also criticized the majority for contradicting the Court's holding in Doe, in which it ruled that a court may grant immunity only after a formal request pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § § 6002 and 6003.182 In contrast to Doe, the dissent stated, the majority opinion results in "'new judicially created evidentiary rules, conferring upon individuals . 182 Id. at 2300-01 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy noted that Doe "rejected the argument that compelled production necessarily carried with it a grant of constructive immunity." Id. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
the Court finds constitutionally intolerable."' ' 8 3 Finally, the dissent disagreed with the majority's concern over the government's ability to regulate white-collar crime, asserting that "the Fifth Amendment does not authorize exceptions premised on such rationales."' 184 Justice Kennedy noted that the majority exaggerated the dangers of recognizing an act of production privilege. 18 5 Justice Kennedy reminded the majority that the Court would grant a privilege only on a case-by-case basis when the custodian could prove as a factual issue that his act of production would be both testimonial and self-incriminating. 186 The dissent recalled that Fisher denied a fifth amendment privilege where " 'the existence and location of the papers [were] a foregone conclusion,' " and accordingly, the act of production was not sufficiently testimonial. Justice Kennedy also noted that the government would need to request statutory immunity only for the custodian and only with respect to the act of production. 1 8 8 He stated that this would allow the government to: receive the documents necessary for prosecution; 189 use the contents of the documents as evidence against anyone, including the custodian; 19 0 and utilize the testimony implicit in the custodian's act of production against everyone but the custodian himself. 19 1 According to Justice Kennedy, the majority implied that a custodian waives his fifth amendment right by accepting employment as the agent of a collective entity. 192 Justice Kennedy noted, however, that most people are not able to choose their employer, let alone their employers' business structure. 19 3 Furthermore, the dissent pointed out, there is no basis for holding that acceptance of employ-ment constitutes a waiver of constitutional rights. The dissent concluded by charging that the majority's denial of the act of production privilege, and its blindness to the government's obvious desire to personally incriminate Braswell, was "factually unsound, unnecessary for legitimate regulation, and a violation of the Self- Braswell, *the target of a federal investigation, of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. 19 9 The decision was misguided in its dogged adherence to agency principles, thereby creating a dualistic record custodian. 20 0 Thus, while the government conducted a grand jury investigation of Braswell as an individual, the majority steadfastly refused to accord him that same status, opting instead to label Braswell as the agent of a collective entity. Finally, the Court's decision was untimely, for it reaffirmed the collective entity doctrine which the lower courts, and the Court itself, had struggled to apply and begun to drift away from in favor of a more uniform and easily applied compelled testimony standard. 
A. THE MAJORITY'S MISAPPLIED AGENCY RATIONALE
The Braswell majority relied extensively on agency principles to distinguish Braswell from the two corporations 20 2 and to reject Braswell's claimed act of production privilege. 20 3 The Court historically distinguished between the individual and the entity as a concomitant to the Court's privacy rationale. 20 4 The Court in Fisher and Doe, however, explicitly rejected the privacy rationale as a basis for fifth amendment analysis. 20 5 Instead, the Court stated that the fifth amendment "protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications. ' 20 6 While the agency distinction between the individual and the entity was a necessary offshoot of a privacy standard, it has no logical connection to the inquiry of whether there is compelled testimonial incrimination. 20 7 Thus, the Braswell majority erred in relying on agency principles as the thread holding together the Court's "metaphysical progression.-2 08
The agency distinction was particularly tenuous under the facts of Braswell. Braswell produced substantial evidence at trial showing that the corporations had no identity apart from his own. 20 9 Bras- 207 The distinction between an individual and an entity made sense under a privacy standard as a means of determining the availability of a fifth amendment privilege. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. Documents belonging to the individual were considered private and therefore were protected; those belonging to an artificial entity were deemed not private and thus were not protected. There is no relationship, however, between the distinction of the individual from the entity, and the Court's three criteria for determining a fifth amendment privilege -compulsion, testimony, and incrimination. See Note, Organizational Papers and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 99 HARV. L. REV. 640, 647 (1986) [hereinafter Organizational Papers] (suggesting that courts should not distinguish between personal and organizational records for fifth amendment purposes). 208 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2299-300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 209 Braswell introduced into evidence twelve facts that supported his claim:
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[Vol. 79 well also introduced evidence that he incorporated his sole proprietorships merely for the sake of appearance 210 and not to reap the traditional benefit of limited personal liability for corporate debts. 21 1 Furthermore, Braswell claimed a fifth amendment privilege in response to a federal investigation of him personally on pos-
(1) Randy Braswell owns, and has always owned 100%o of the stock of the active corporation.
(2) The corporation has only one employee other than Randy Braswell, this being the secretary, who is Braswell's sister-in-law.
(3) Braswell's authority over the corporation is "absolute, total, [and] complete." (4) Braswell has no personal checking account, only the corporate one.
(5) Braswell's personal expenses, and those of his wife, are paid out of the corporate checking account.
(6) Randy Braswell is the only individual who has the authority to act on behalf of the corporation, and is the only person who has ever acted on behalf of the corporation.
(7) Braswell has total control over the contents of the records of the business. It hurt you as far as business was concerned to go in and say I'm Randy Braswell from Magnolia, Mississippi. We felt it was [an] advantage to us strictly as a matter of form to incorporate. Brief for Petitioner at 4. 211 This claim was supported by the fact that Braswell had personally guaranteed the corporations' debts, and thus was not attempting to limit his liability for potential business failure. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1987) , aff'd sub nom. Braswell v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 Ct. (1988 . See also supra note 209. The incorporating attorney also testified that there were no income tax, pension or profit sharing reasons for Braswell's incorporating his businesses. Brief for Petitioner at 4.
It should be noted, however, that aside from the limited personal liability for corporate debts, corporate officers and directors are shielded from personal liability for torts committed by the corporation. Barry v. Legler, 39 F.2d 297, 300 (8th Cir. 1930 ). Thus, Braswell would have benefited from the corporate form if either corporation was found liable for damages in a tort action. sible charges of personal income tax fraud. 2 12 These facts illustrate that Braswell was not merely a representative agent of a larger independent entity, as the majority implied.
The majority's rejection of Braswell's personal fifth amendment privilege, premised heavily on a supposed distinction between Braswell and the corporate entities, resulted in a decision that contradicted the Court's very own analysis. Indeed, the Court's stubborn adherence to its agency rationale created a dualistic record custodian: while the government viewed Braswell as an individual, the Court effectively viewed Braswell as a corporate entity, and accordingly denied his claimed personal privilege; in doing so, however, the Court allowed the government to prosecute Braswell as an individual despite the Court's insistence that he was not an individual possessing a personal fifth amendment right. The majority's analysis also reaffirmed a distinction, which the Court itself has struggled to define, between employees of various business organizations. 2 1 4 Thus, while the Court has rejected claimed fifth amendment privileges with respect to corporate 2 1 5 and labor union documents, 2 16 the Court nonetheless has allowed a fifth amendment privilege for producing proprietorship records. 2 17 The Court's struggle to distinguish between employees of various business organizations has resulted in considerable confusion as is evidenced by Chief Justice Rehnquist's closing statement in Braswell. After rejecting the fifth amendment claim of Randy Braswell, the President, sole shareholder, and virtually sole employee of two corporations, 2 18 the Chief Justice stated: 728 and without the troublesome distinctions evidenced in Braswell. 2 26 Under the compelled testimony standard, a court determines the availability of a fifth amendment privilege simply by examining whether the government is attempting to compel incriminating testimony. 22 7 This analysis precludes the use of agency principles to distinguish between the individual and the entity. It thus avoids the dualistic custodian result, where one custodian is simultaneously prosecuted as an individual and held by the court to represent an artificial entity.
The compelled testimony standard also eliminates the need for courts to distinguish between permissible and impermissible business organizations for fifth amendment purposes. 2 28 This results in a fifth amendment analysis that is easier for the courts to apply, for the court uses only one standard regardless of the employment of the individual claiming the privilege. The compelled testimony standard is also in accord with the collective entity doctrine in that a custodian may not claim a privilege as to the contents of business documents. The collective entity doctrine reaches this conclusion by distinguishing between the individual and the artificial entity, and by attempting to place the given business within a range of permissible or impermissible artificial entities. While the collective entity doctrine has led the Court to distinguish between a corporation with one employee and one with two employees, 23 1 and between a small law firm partnership and a small family partnership, 23 2 the Bellis Court asserted that "the applicability of the fifth amendment privilege should not turn on an insubstantial difference in the form of the business enterprise." 23 3 Such distinctions are irrelevant in the application of the compelled testimony standard. The standard applies uniformly to all individuals, and thus is preferable to the doctrine that the majority applied in Braswell. 234 Braswell claimed neither that the contents of the documents were protected under the fifth amendment, nor that the corporations could assert a privilege with respect to the documents. Braswell, 108 S. Ct. 2287. Rather, Braswell claimed that his act of producing the documents pursuant to the government's subpoena had "independent testimonial significance" which would tend to incriminate him in violation of the fifth amendment. 235 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2286. As Justice Kennedy noted, the fifth amendment does not protect the content of business documents because the creation of such documents is usually not compelled. Id. at 2298-99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also Doe 465 U.S. at 612 n. 10 ("If the party asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege has voluntarily compiled the document, no compulsion is present and the contents of the documents are not privileged.") (emphasis added); Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 6, 40-41 (1986) (distinguishing the self-incriminating nature of the act of production from the content of documents). Because Braswell claimed a privilege only as to the act of production, however, the fact that the subpoena compelled his production was sufficient. 236 The testimonial nature of an individual's act of production was recognized as early as 1904 by John Henry Wigmore. According to Professor Wigmore:
It follows that the production of documents or chattels by a person... in response
Braswell's act of production would have communicated that the documents existed, that they were in his possession, and that he believed them to be authentic. 2 37 Moreover, the broad scope of the subpoena 238 indicated that the government was " 'attempting to compensate for its lack of knowledge by requiring [the custodian] to become, in effect, the primary informant against himself.' "239 to a supboena ... may be refused under the protection of the [fifth amendment] privilege.... For though the documents or chattels thus sought be not oral in form, and though they be already in existence and not desired to be first written and created by a testimonial act or utterance of the person in response to the process, still there is a testimonial disclosure implicit in their production. 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264 at 379-80 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)(emphasis omitted).
The Court later acknowledged the act of production doctrine in Curcio when it stated that "[t]he custodian's act of producing books or records in response to a subpoena duces tecum is itself a representation that the documents produced are those demanded by the subpoena." Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957)(emphasis omitted). See also Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 ("The act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced."); Doe, 465 U.S. at 612.
Thirdly, the government conceded that compelling Braswell to produce the documents would personallly incriminate him. 240 Thus, the elements of the compelled standard were satisfied, and accordingly the Court should have granted Braswell's claimed act of production privilege.
As Justice Kennedy correctly argued, the majority's concern with regulating white-collar crime was both misplaced and overstated. 2 4 1 The concern was misplaced because the fifth amendment does not permit balancing the state's interest in prosecution against an individual's constitutional rights. 24 2 Furthermore, granting a fifth amendment privilege and requesting statutory immunity for the custodian's act of production would enable the government to obtain all documents necessary to conduct its investigation. 24 3 The government could use the contents of the documents to prosecute anyone, including the custodian. 24 4 The government could also use any testimony implicit in the custodian's act of production against anyone except the custodian. 24 5 Thus, granting a fifth amendment privilege would hinder the government's ability to regulate whitecollar crime only when the act of production testimony is both critical to the government's case against the custodian, and unobtainable from sources independent of the custodian's act of production. Crime] (surveying the case law on fifth amendment protection for the compelled production of business documents).
242 One author has suggested that:
[t]he fifth amendment is concerned with procedural values: it maintains the integrity of the law enforcement system by limiting the state's ability to demand a defendant's participation in the determination of his own guilt. It is not concerned with the substantive results of trials -that is, whether or not guilt is established.
Hence, the fact that... the privilege might make prosecution more difficult should be of little, if any, relevance. Thus, when the court grants a fifth amendment privilege for the custodian's act of production, he need be immunized only for the testimony derived from his act of production. Doe explicitly rejected the notion that immunization for the act of production necessarily covers the documents' contents. Doe, 465 U.S. at 617 n.17. and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify.' "). See supra note 237 regarding the "foregone conclusion" test. See also Organizational Papers, supra note 207, at 650-51 (arguing that fifth amendment protection would not unduly hinder the government's ability to prosecute white collar crime).
247 See Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2295, 2300-01 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The majority rejected Braswell's claimed act of production privilege, but held instead that the government could make no evidentiary use of the act against Braswell. Id. at 2295. ChiefJustice Rehnquist conceded, however, that the jury nonetheless would infer the incriminating act of production testimony against Braswell, especially given the nature and size of the corporations. Id. The veil of constitutional protection thus extended to Braswell was a "chimera." See supra note 112 and accompanying text. The ChiefJustice justified this result by relying further on the agency rationale, stating that "[b]ecause the jury is not told that the defendant produced the records, any nexus between the defendant and the documents results solely from the corporations's act of production." Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2295 (emphasis added). For a comprehensive discussion of criminal immunity, see White Collar Crime, supra note 241, at 631-46.
248 Doe, 465 U.S. at 616.
249 Id. at 616-17 ("We decline to extend the jurisdiction of courts to include prospective grants of use immunity in the absence of the formal request that the statute requires."). 250 Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 251 Id. at 2295 n.ll. 252 See supra notes 10 1-07 and accompanying text. Braswell relied on Curcio as a cornerstone of his act of production claim. Curcio held that the government may not compel a union custodian to give testimony about the union's records, and recognized that the act of production is implicitly testimonial. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 123-25 (1957).
same day as Braswel1 2 53 by an eight-to-one Court in Doe H:
[T]he Fifth Amendment comes into play "only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating.". . . Petitioner has articulated no cogent argument as to why the "testimonial" requirement should have one meaning in the context of acts, and another meaning in the context of verbal statements. 254 Thus, the fifth amendment protects both oral testimony and testimonial acts. 2 55 The Braswell majority accordingly should have granted a fifth amendment privilege for Braswell's testimonial act of production.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Braswell v. United States, the United States Supreme Court denied the fifth amendment right of a corporate custodian for his act of producing corporate records pursuant to a subpoena. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed the agency-based collective entity doctrine, despite the Court's recent trend toward a fifth amendment analysis that emphasizes protection against compelled, testimonial selfincrimination.
The compelled testimony standard, however, is a preferable standard of fifth amendment analysis. It is a simplified three-step analysis that eliminates the need to distinguish between an individual and an entity in cases in which the difference is not readily apparent. The compelled testimony standard eliminates the need for courts to draw often contradictory distinctions between permissible and impermissible business organizations for fifth amendment purposes. The compelled testimony standard even embraces the same principles as the collective entity doctrine, yet avoids the confusion of competing standards. Most importantly, the compelled testi- 255 See Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)("Physical acts will constitute testimony if they probe the state of mind, memory, perception, or cognition of the witness. The Court should not retreat from the plain implications of this rule and hold that such testimony may be compelled, even when self-incriminating, simply because it is 
